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Abstract
When discussing O. W. Holmes’s answer to the question
What constitutes the law? Morton White underlines the
fact that Holmes’s inquiry didn’t focus on developing the
concept of law. White states: ‘…Holmes said little in The
Path of the Law about the notion of legal authority, perhaps
because he was interested not in what he called a “useless
quintessence of all legal systems” but in “an accurate anat-
omy of one”’. Such ambition (or lack of ambition) is charac-
teristic of many pragmatic enterprises in the field of jurispru-
dence. However, sometimes the opposition between legal
pragmatism and other legal theories is built upon a refer-
ence to the notion of the ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of law. Many
legal philosophers who aim to reveal the very ‘nature of
law’ (or ‘the concept of law’ as H. L. A. Hart did) try to
interpret Holmes and other pragmatists as offering a com-
petitive view to their own. I will follow White’s early intu-
ition that such a construal of the controversy is simply
wrong. Afterwards I will sketch a portrait of legal pragma-
tism in the context of White’s own inquiry and his version of
‘holistic pragmatism’; thirdly, I will present in brief the main
reasons for exploring the concept of law in the contempo-
rary analytic philosophy of law. Then I will show that tradi-
tionally ‘pragmatic’ and ‘analytic’ efforts in legal theory are
situated on different levels of generality and conceptuality.
However, these efforts can be, at least to some extent, reor-
dered under the aegis of holistic pragmatism.
Keywords: legal pragmatism, holistic pragmatism, O.W.
Holmes, H.L.A. Hart, M.G. White
1 The Methodological
Objection
One of the most important matters in science and phi-
losophy is the way in which we formulate questions;
hence, the object of inquiry is, at least to some extent,
implicitly suggested in every preliminary question
asked. Thus, probably one of the most important (and,
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equally, most commonplace) accusations against a cer-
tain legal theory is the ‘methodological objection’ (MO).
In its general form, it is as follows:
(MO) The discussed theory fails because it uses the
wrong methodology and asks the wrong questions,
which precludes the theory from reaching the right
(adequate) conclusions. Without putting our ques-
tions in the right way, we cannot grasp any substan-
tial answers, i.e. such answers that (at least) could
have a claim to adequacy.1
It seems, then, that for researchers who use this argu-
ment against a particular theory T, the theory T fails on
its own grounds because it asks the wrong questions
and, thus, receives inadequate answers. However, it is
important not to simply equate inadequate answers with
false answers. It may well be that the explanations pro-
posed by T are true, but nevertheless, these truths can
be assessed as falling beyond the ‘real interest’ of the
particular (legal) theory. Therefore, even true theoreti-
cal answers can be inadequate in the sense that they are
answers to the ‘wrong questions’ (and thus irrelevant) or
even that they are the answers to questions that have
actually never been asked (or need not have been asked)!
To say ‘Sorry, but you missed the important methodo-
logical point’ is to claim that the whole theoretical effort
made in order to answer questions has been useless. For
sure, there is nothing more frustrating for a theorist
than to hear something like that!
In such circumstances, theory T may be true, but never-
theless, it would not be a theory of the right sort. To put
it in another way, it would not be the theory of the thing
that it pretends to be the theory of. The label is wrong;
therefore, after the successful conduct of the MO, theo-
ry T is compromised.
The methodological objection is a very popular critical
move and probably the one that allows individuals to
undermine a theory at the very beginning, without mak-
ing any deeper research about its content. On the other
hand, if the basic questions are, in the eyes of a critic,
put rightly, she/he has to examine a substantial part of
the theory more thoroughly. However, the answers giv-
1. Generally speaking, ‘adequate claims’ are ontic characteristics of things
that are neither too narrow (and thus lacking some element or explana-
tion) nor too vast (where characterisation is replete with elements that
are unnecessary to properly describe or explain a thing). According to
that definition, MO is primarily designed against descriptive-explanato-
ry theories. In case of normative-evaluative theories, MO can be used
only partially to discredit descriptive assumptions of such theory (on the
basis that these assumptions are not the assumptions of the right kind).
It is however hard to imagine how MO could be applied against purely
normative theories (if there are any).
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en by a particular theory could not ever be conceived as
irrevocable, solid, final answers. Any possibility of
reaching Peirce’s “Final Opinion” shall be rather con-
ceived as an ideal, and thus, we are allowed to give only
preliminary answers, which surely would not be perfect-
ly, ideally adequate, but may appear to be practically
adequate in the sense that they would stand as sufficient
reasons to formulate answers, despite the awareness of
their potential incompleteness. And such answers would
not only be of theoretical but also of practical impor-
tance.
Let us say that a ‘human’ theory should aim at giving
answers in the most intuitive, practical sense (attempt-
ing to reach the possible, practical optimum) – answers
that could be understood and rationally discussed by
different parties. As C. S. Peirce stated, the main task of
any inquiry or investigation is ‘the settlement of (true)
opinion’ about reality, though humans might fail to
reach the ultimate opinion on any question ‘as long as
the human race should last’.2 A ‘true belief’ in such a
scheme is a temporary, ‘calm and satisfactory state’
attained when the irritation and the doubt have been
removed. The more practical a belief is, the more it
becomes a longer and a more comfortable stop on our
way to the ultimate true opinion (that would probably
never be achieved).
In the following sections, I want to deal with particular,
uncharitable criticisms of legal pragmatism. On that
ground, there arises a question about the method of con-
ceptual analysis applied by legal pragmatists. Having
answered this question, I can focus on the holistic prag-
matism understood as a general, philosophical back-
ground for differing and prima facie inconsistent con-
ceptions of law.
2 How Does the Critique
Usually Go?
The first thing I would like to focus on is the way the
critique of non-pragmatist thinkers against legal prag-
matism usually goes. There are actually a few ways to
defy legal pragmatism. The first one is to undermine its
philosophical background as, in the least, inaccurate.
One must be perfectly acquainted with the philosophy
of pragmatism to follow that line of thought. In fact,
critics are often only generally aware of what such
thinkers as W. James, C. S. Peirce, G. H. Mead, J.
Dewey, and others have said on the matter. Such critics
use maxims and epigrams rather than arguments and do
not care whether their own interpretations fulfil the so-
called charity principle. That is why the history of the
critique of philosophical pragmatism (and its counter-
parts like legal pragmatism) is a story of misinterpreta-
tions. Significantly, W. James observed a long time ago
2. C.S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear? (1878), access online:
<www. marxists. org/ reference/ subject/ philosophy/ works/ us/ peirce.
htm>.
that such situations were ‘nothing new’.3 This observa-
tion remains true.
D. Lind has recently pointed out that some authors, like
R. Dworkin, D. Luban, P. S. Atiyah, and B. Z. Tama-
naha, attempt to undermine legal pragmatism by saying
that it is ‘amorphous’, ‘antitheoretical’, and ‘skeptical
jurisprudence’, one that ‘languishes in indeterminacy,
depreciates the instinctive structure of legal reasoning
and decision making, and commits a host of other juris-
prudential sins’.4 Probably the most important reason
for such a labeling of legal pragmatism is that it is
viewed as ‘result oriented or instrumental’, where
adherence to precedent and rules is only contingent and
not based on principle, as far as making a decision is
always ‘instrumentally important’ for a community.5 In
a similar way, R. Dworkin argues that pragmatism sup-
ports an approach to adjudication that ‘holds that judges
should always decide the cases before them in a for-
ward-looking consequentialist style’,6 and thus, he ‘sees
pragmatism as a worrisome interpretive conception of
law that sacrifices principle and integrity for whatever
outcomes would seem to be “best for the future without
concern for the past”’.7 I am not going to repeat Lind’s
way of defending legal pragmatism against these accusa-
tions here. I will limit myself only to notice that his way
of argument reinterprets the misunderstood claims of
legal pragmatists like O. W. Holmes and B. Cardozo in
the light of certain background philosophical assump-
tions. Thus, he simply shows that ‘result orientation’,
‘instrumentalism’, ‘antitheoretical character’, and so on
are not exactly what these critics think them to be.8
Quite a similar strategy of defence was developed by S.
Haack who presented the interpretation of Holmes’s
position in the philosophico-historical context of its ori-
gin.9 In such cases as these, the conclusion of the whole
analysis is that the critics have simply misunderstood
what is at stake with pragmatism.
Unfortunately, the approach consisting of criticising
philosophical pragmatism (both as a general movement
and as a theory of a particular thinker) from an expert’s
point of view, and subsequently falsifying claims of legal
pragmatism on the basis of such a (‘charitable’) critique,
3. W. James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking
(1907), Lecture I.
4. D. Lind, ‘The Mismeasurement of Legal Pragmatism’, 4 (2) Washington
University Jurisprudence Review 213, at 213-4 (2012).
5. D. Luban, ‘What’s Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?,’ 18 Cardozo
Law Review 43 (1996).
6. R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006), at 21.
7. Lind (2012), above n. 4, at 215; cf. R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986),
at 151.
8. In one of my articles I call these critics “Momosian critics”, derived from
the name Momos, a Greek god of evil-spirited blame and unfair criti-
cism (and not a ‘momos’ as a dumpling!). See A. Dyrda, ‘Momosa prag-
matyzm prawny: rzeczywiste granice teorii, rozsądne granice krytyki, 2
Jurysprudencja (special volume: ‘Integracja zewnętrzna i wewnętrzna
nauk prawnych, cz.1’)[‘Internal and External Integration of Jurispru-
dence, part 1’] 149 (2014).
9. S. Haack, ‘On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does “The Path of the Law”
Lead Us?’, 50 American Journal of Jurisprudence, 71 (2005).
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is rather rare. Usually10 the objection takes the following
direction. As indicated above (in the case of Dworkin
and Luban), one says that legal pragmatism is simply
wrong, as it misses the point of legal theorising, that is, a
careful analysis of basic legal concepts (this is a version
of the MO argument), which would eventually reveal
the true ‘nature’ of law (a kind of ‘substantial argu-
ment’). By making such statements, critics try to pres-
ent substantial arguments, as well as the MO against
legal pragmatism, usually without any deeper knowl-
edge of legal pragmatism’s rationale, namely, its philo-
sophical foundations and its proper methodology. In the
above-mentioned critiques, especially of Luban and
Dworkin, the MO argument and substantial arguments
are mixed together (and they are surely linked: substan-
tial claims are strictly related to the assumed methodo-
logical theses, because, I suppose, assumed methodology
circumscribes the scope of possible questions and limits,
or otherwise underdetermines, a possible understanding
of a theory)11. Lind tries to defend legal pragmatism by
showing that substantial points have been misunder-
stood by the critics, which eventually shows that the
methodological stance of these thinkers towards legal
pragmatism is wrong. Such a way of defending legal
pragmatism is fair but, to my mind, also too extensive
and wearisome. I think that it is much easier to formu-
late the argument against prejudiced critics the other
way around, i.e. firstly, to describe the basic methodo-
logical stance of legal pragmatism and then, secondly, to
compare it with the methodology assumed by critics.
Such an argument would be more beneficial and univer-
sal, since it could be used not only against certain meth-
ods of critiquing (that are based, amongst others, on
substantial arguments) but against all theories that seem
to reach different substantial claims by assuming (at
least prima facie) quite different methodologies. This
way of arguing is, to some extent, implicit in what S.
Haack or B. Leiter has been writing recently on legal
pragmatism (realism).12 This would also allow us to
show, by detailed analysis of theories compared, that a
clarification of present misunderstandings can also lead
to reconcile them (which were at first glance so differ-
ent).
The pivotal problem is as follows: what is the meaning
of conceptual analysis or concept explanation in legal
pragmatism and other theories of law? Moreover, does
legal pragmatism seek what all the apostles of general
10. There are also serious critics of legal pragmatism who are not subject to
my argument. I think that they are ‘serious’ to a large extent because
they accept, at least provisionally, the holistic account I present in the
following section.
11. S. Perry rightly notices: ‘Because jurisprudence lies within a rather
unstable area of intersection between philosophy and social theory,
methodological questions tend to be as controverted as substantive
questions, and often two become inextricably entangled’ (S. Perry
‘Holmes v. Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory’, in S. Burton (ed.), The
Path of The Law and Its Influence: The Legacy of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. (2000) 158, at 160.
12. Cf. Haack (2005), above n. 9; B. Leiter, ‘Legal Realism and Legal Positi-
vism Reconsidered’, 111(2) Ethics 278 (2001).
jurisprudence13 try to find: the ‘essence’, the ‘nature’,
and the ‘concept of law’? The answer is surely negative,
but critics (usually, but not always, apostles of analyti-
cal, general jurisprudence) wrongly assume that legal
pragmatism attempts to answer such questions, and
much of their writings (Hart’s argument against legal
realism is a prime example here) are devoted to showing
that legal pragmatism is an inadequate theory of law just
because it cannot solve definitely general, conceptual
questions which would eventually trigger essentialist
answers (although I think that the general ‘essentialist
objection’14 against all general-jurisprudential efforts is
not valid in each and every case). The situation in which
legal pragmatism, notably represented by Holmes or
Cardozo, is placed by uncharitable critics resembles the
way in which the philosophical pragmatism of James,
for instance, was criticised by G. E. Moore and B. Rus-
sell, who actually thought that James had been trying to
elaborate on ‘truth’ as a concept (and was willing to pro-
pose a synonym for the word ‘truth’), whereas, on the
13. I’m thinking of the general, analytical jurisprudence in a wider sense,
including not only H.L.A. Hart and his descendants, but R. Dworkin and
his followers as well – i.e. the sense in which the one, abstract relation
between important legal concepts is supposed be established by a theo-
ry. S. Perry uses in this context the term ‘comprehensive theory of law’
(Perry, above n. 11). The relation between ‘essence’ (understood as
necessary and sufficient feature of being such-and-such, wider than
essence, covering also typical but not necessary features of an object)
and “concept” (the most general term) is a mater of persistent contro-
versy. It is not clear what the task of general jurisprudence is. Is it the
explanation of the concept of law? Or maybe it is the inquiry into the
very nature or even essence of law? Hart’s basic project can be under-
stood to large extent as anti-essentialist, for Hart, in the first chapter of
The Concept of Law does not want to provide the real definition of law
in its classical form (genus proximum + differentia specifica). Such
interpretation is presented for example by F. Schauer. It is not clear,
however, whether Hart’s position precludes from providing other, more
complicated forms of real definition of law, the more that providing
such a definition does not amount merely to present a semantic equiva-
lent (and thus Dworkin’s famous semantic sting argument does not
apply here). So, even if we accept the ‘anti-essentialist’ interpretation of
Hart’s enterprise in the simplest meaning of that that term (cf. F. Schau-
er, ‘Hart’s Anti-Essentialism’, in A. Dolcetti, L. Duarte d’Almeida & J.
Edwards (eds.), Reading H.L.A. Hart’s ‘The Concept of Law’ (2013),
237, there is still much place for more detailed conceptual work to be
done within his account in generally essentialist spirit. The question
asked by Hart is ‘what is law?’ and this is a purely metaphysical ques-
tion. Whether the answer refers to the idea of law’s ‘essence’, ‘nature’
or ‘concept’, in each case answer would at least imply some kind of
metaphysical solution. Basing on that intuition, pervasive in post-Har-
tian general jurisprudence, J. Raz wrote: ‘In as much as a general theory
of law is about the nature of law it strives to elucidate law’s essential
features, i.e., those features which are possessed by every legal system
just in virtue of its being legal, by every legislative institution in virtue of
being legislative, by every practice of legal reasoning in virtue of its
being a practice of legal reasoning, and so on. A claim of necessity is
the nature of the enterprise’ (J. Raz ‘On the Nature of Law’, in J. Raz
(ed.), Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and
Practical Reason (2009) 91, at 92. In case of Dworkin, although he
himself claims that the ‘nature’ of law is nothing more than ‘conforming
mantra, positivism’s phlogiston’ (R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006),
at 216), in his well known argumentation he continually refers to ‘true
proposition of law’ and ‘grounds of law’, what at least conceptually
presupposes that such grounds exists (and this a metaphysical thesis as
well; in case of Dworkin such thesis is supported by a peculiar version of
moral realism). In this sense contemporary general jurisprudence shares
the basic tenets of Langdellism and Begriffjurisprudenz.
14. Haack (2005), above n. 9.
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contrary, James ‘saw himself as an inquirer into the
motives of […] truth-claimers, an inquirer into the cau-
ses of beliefs, just as he saw himself as an inquirer into
the sources or causes of religious feelings in the Variet-
ies’.15 The assumption that Holmes and other legal prag-
matists tried to answer the same questions about law
that analytic legal philosophers habitually ask has led
critics like Hart or Dworkin completely astray. Just as
James was not concerned with finding a synonym for
‘truth’, Holmes was not interested in presenting the
analysis of the concept of law (the ‘nature’ of law, as J.
Raz would put it), with all the abstract and general char-
acteristics it was supposed to have. I think that many of
the contemporary analyses of legal pragmatism,16
including comparisons with other theories, are inquisi-
tive enough to see what is at stake with such critics.
However, this case is not new. In fact, one of the most
influential thinkers who put forward that legal pragma-
tism is not the kind of ‘conceptual theory’ the critics
expect it to be was M. G. White.
In the subsequent parts of the paper, I will discern the
general view which encompasses the important philo-
sophical background for pragmatism as a whole, namely,
White’s ‘holistic pragmatism’. Then, by application of
this philosophical stance to legal theory (by a quick anal-
ysis of an interesting example of O. W. Holmes’s
approach), I will present in a nutshell the difference
between the pragmatic concept explanation and the
methodology of concept analysis assumed by major fig-
ures of general (conceptual) jurisprudence. In effect, the
thesis that the ‘cynical’ but poetical answers that
Holmes and his pragmatist followers give to important
jurisprudential questions are to some extent ‘indepen-
dent’ from any metaphysical or essentialist conceptions
of law (like legal positivism, law as integrity, etc.)17 nev-
ertheless does not mean that they are not (or could not
be) eventually underdetermined by some general juris-
prudential conceptions. This will show that the MO
argument against legal pragmatism from the general-
jurisprudence position (that sometimes reminds a
‘trench warfare’) is not a valid one. Unless a critic
embraces strong metaphysical assumptions about law,
her analysis of the concept of law would be coherent
with holistically underdetermined general theory of law
(like legal positivism). In other words, if a legal theorist
15. M.G. White, The Philosophy of Culture: The Scope of Holistic Pragma-
tism (2002), at 22; cf. S. Pihlström, ‘Morton White’s Philosophy of Cul-
ture: Holistic Pragmatism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry’, 21 Human
Affairs 140 (2011), at 146.
16. Leiter (2001), above n. 12; Haack (2005), above n. 9.
17. Pragmatists’ anti-essentialism expresses the thesis that the way we think
about things we want to describe (the way we weave the web of belief)
determines our conception of these things. In this sense, there is no
metaphysical necessity involved in analysis (I deliberately put aside the
problem of epistemic necessity). On the other hand, the broadly con-
ceived essentialism proclaims the thesis that there is something necessa-
ry we can say about things like law, even if in result of performed anal-
ysis we get, for example, a cluster of minor concepts. If a theorist thinks
that there is a solid truth-maker for ‘propositions of law’ (like the one
established by the rule of recognition, either inclusive or exclusive), then
a theorist is an essentialist and a metaphysician, at least in a broad
sense.
at least remains skeptical in connection with basic meta-
physical assumptions about reality, including ‘the
nature of law’, legal pragmatism and some particular
types of conceptual, general theory of law can simply
coexist. In this sense, these two differing positions can
be reconciled.
3 Holistic Pragmatism and Law
M. G. White indicates that ‘holistic pragmatism’ is the
view developed in W. V. Quine’s masterpiece Two Dog-
mas of Empiricism, where he wrote: ‘Each man is given a
scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory
stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in
warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing sen-
sory prompting are, where rational, pragmatic’.18 Four
elements are characteristic of that view:19 (1) this view is
about the behaviour of human beings and their heritage
(some cultural phenomena); (2) a scientific heritage is
understood as a conjunction of many beliefs rather than
as one non-conjunctive belief, what eventually leads to
the claim that that our beliefs (or sentences) are not tes-
ted individually but ‘face the tribunal of experience’ in
corporate bodies (‘holism’);20 (3) there is the reference
to a barrage or sensory stimulation or a flux of experi-
ence (‘empiricism’); and (4) there is the reference to the
pragmatic warping of a scientific heritage that has to fit
sensory promptings (‘pragmatism’). As White writes:
‘According to holistic pragmatism, scientists’ warpings
are carried out with concern for the elegance or simplic-
ity of the theory they adopt and with the intention to
warp the heritage conservatively’,21 thus engaging ‘min-
imum modification’ (James) or ‘minimum mutilation’
(W. V. Quine) of it.22 Being as it is, the holistic pragma-
tism is primarily opposed to classical rationalism (the
view that we can have knowledge that is not tested by
experience; in its contemporary form espoused by Des-
cartes). Moreover, in pure versions of holistic pragma-
tism, the dualism between ‘the analytic’ and ‘the syn-
thetic’, to some extent accepted by some pre-pragmatist
thinkers (like Hume’s distinction between ‘experimental
thinking’ and ‘abstract thinking’), as well as some classi-
cal pragmatists (according to White, neither W. James
nor J. Dewey fully escaped from this dichotomy), is
abandoned. The theory, being a conjunction of different
kinds of statements (logical, empirical), must fit the sen-
sory promptings, and if we want to make this relation of
‘fitting of belief’ work, sometimes even some logical
18. W.V. Quine ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in W.V. Quine, From a Logi-
cal Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays (1953) 20, at 46.
19. White (2002), above n. 15, at 1.
20. Cf. Pihlström (2011), above n. 15, at 141.
21. White (2002), above n. 15, at 2.
22. W. James, Pluralism, Pragmatism and Instrumental Truth (1907), 52,
above n. 3, at 61, where James writes about ‘minimum of modification’
(online: <www. uky. edu/ ~eushe2/ Pajares/ jpluralism. html>); cf. Quine
(1953). Arguments against this pragmatic theory of belief revision see
H. Rott, ‘Two Dogmas of Belief Revision’, internet access <www. lucs. lu.
se/ / spinning/ categories/ dynamics/ Rott/ Rott. pdf>.
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statements – or according to legal positivists ‘analytic
truths’ – should be rejected. That stays in close connec-
tion with an abandoning of ‘the spectator’s view’ in all
fields of inquiry – scientific, moral, legal, and artistic,
which are all equal subfields of cultural philosophy
(being actually a metaphilosophical position)23. Howev-
er, the difference between statements characteristic of
each subdiscipline is not, as Quine ultimately thought,
different in kind, but only, according to White, different
in degree.24
M. G. White, inspired not only by Quine but also by J.
Dewey (‘epistemological gradualism’) and A. Tarski
(‘epistemological holism’), extended the restrictive view
that Quine held himself, namely, the view that ‘the phi-
losophy of science is philosophy enough’. Quine’s line
of argument was strictly connected with his idea of
‘naturalised epistemology’. Such a remnant of logical
positivism as ‘rationalism’, against which Quine argued
in his article,25 should be replaced by the fully fledged
holistic pragmatism, according to which ‘the philosophy
of culture is philosophy enough’. In this view, science is
only one of many cultural institutions that are interest-
ing for philosophers (once Quine himself compared sci-
ence to the Wittgenstein’s language game: ‘the game of
science’26). And these institutions should be described,
analysed, or explored on equal rights. According to
White, ‘we may distinguish different disciplines associ-
ated with various elements of culture on the basis of
their different vocabularies and substantive statements,
but not by saying that we use fundamentally different
methods in supporting those statements’.27 All of these
disciplines – ethics, law, art, and science – are ‘anchored
in experience’, and all of them are corrigible but cogni-
tive enterprises, which eventually form altogether a
‘holistic totality’ instead of ‘any compartmentalised
group of distinct areas with definite boundaries’.28 To
put it in a slightly different manner, in science, morali-
ty, art, and law, we use the same empirical method
requiring ‘an examination of how we do and should use
language’. That is not an effort characteristic of rational-
ists or certain significant twentieth-century thinkers (B.
Russell, G. E. Moore, C. I. Lewis, R. Carnap) for
decomposing concepts. White assesses the rational
23. As H. Putnam, a disciple of M. White, recognises, the abandonment of
‘the spectator’s view’, that Quine, Goodman, or Davidson themselves
postulate, would mean nothing ‘if we don’t extend the pragmatic
approach to the most indispensable “versions” of ourselves and our
world that we possess’ (H. Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (1987),
at 21; cf. Pihlström, above n. 15, at 141).
24. White (2002), above n. 15, at 154-5.
25. Quine (1953), above n. 18.
26. Quine wrote: ‘… [W]hen I cite predictions as the checkpoints of sci-
ence, I do not see that as normative. I see it as defining a particular lan-
guage game, in Wittgenstein’s phrase: the game of science, in contrast
to other good language games such as fiction and poetry. A sentence’s
claim to scientific status rests on what it contributes to a theory whose
checkpoints are in prediction’ (W.V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (1990, at
20; cf. M. Murphey, The Development of Quine’s Philosophy (2012),
at 241; cf. D.G. Windblad, ‘Scepticism, Science, Quine and Wittgen-
stein,’ in R. Arrington, H-J. Glock (eds.), Wittgenstein and Quine 97
(1996).
27. White (2002), above n. 15, at 3.
28. Pihlström (2011), above n. 15, at 143.
methods of analysis, due to the failure of the analytic-
synthetic distinction and the paradox of analysis, as
unfruitful. On the contrary, the holistic program is a
struggle against apriorism connected with various forms
of rationalism, and, for sure, holistic pragmatists appre-
ciate the strength of their rationalistic foes. In 1877, C.
S. Peirce wrote that the rationalistic, a priori method
was the most intellectual and respectable of all the old
methods. He also pointed out: ‘its failure has been the
most manifest’.29 Holistic pragmatism elaborates against
any ultimate rationalisation, or what Dewey once called
‘the quest for certainty’, that reminds us of the most
important point: both in science par excellence and in
‘soft sciences’ (law, art, ethics), there are no ready-made
solutions in advance of particular problems.
It is, however, important to stress that holistic pragma-
tism ought to be conceived as a rule (a normative stance)
rather than a descriptive statement.30 It is the method of
testing our beliefs, being, in fact, a normative method of
how one should philosophise (metaphilosophy), being
neither analytic, a priori, necessary, nor self-evident. It
is rather ‘our best guess so far’ that should be followed
‘in a fallibilist spirit’.31
In the field of law, holistic pragmatism can be found in
W. James’s Pragmatism,32 where he wrote ‘given previ-
ous law and a novel case…the judge will twist them into
fresh law’ which – as White notices – reflects the
demeanor of a scientist who ‘begins with a conjunction
of previous truths, encounters fresh facts, and incorpo-
rates fresh truths or revises the old’.33 It is quite inter-
esting that just a decade before James wrote this, O. W.
Holmes had delivered his famous speech ‘The Path of
the Law’. This speech is a great source of immortal epi-
grams, either expressing his antirationalist position
(‘The life of the law has not been logic, it has been expe-
rience’) or his, as simple as it is controversial, answer to
the question: What consitutes the law? (‘The prophecies
of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pre-
tentious, are what I mean by the law’).
Holmes’s lecture, as we know, focused on the approach
of an operative lawyer who is bound to present to a bill-
paying client the best possible prediction of the judicial
decision. As a heuristic position, using some kind of
binoculars through which the lawyer tries to formulate a
prediction of the decision (like an analyst who tries to
forecast weather), Holmes presents the ‘bad man’s point
of view’, who does not care ‘a straw’ about rules and
precedents, but simply wants to be kept out of jail (and
thus he must anticipate the future judicial decree).
Many objections have been raised against this concep-
tion. One of the most influential was the critique devel-
29. C.S. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief (1877), online access: <www. peirce.
org/ writings/ p107. html>.
30. White (2002), above n. 15, ch. XI; cf. Pihlström (2011), above n. 15, at
143.
31. Therefore, it should be possible to critically evaluate or test holistic
pragmatism by use of holistic pragmatism (cf. Pihlström, above n. 15, at
143).
32. James, above n. 3, Lecture VII.
33. White (2002), above n. 15, at 126.
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oped by H. L. A. Hart, who noticed that, firstly, law
cannot be perceived as consisting only of predictions,
and secondly, we should not always regard the lawyer’s
client as a bad man only. Hart’s effort in a few passages
in The Concept of Law was to show that Holmes’s legal
realism is wrong due to the fact that there really exists
something that falls under the concept of ‘legal obliga-
tion’ (or, more generally, the concept of ‘legality’). Hart
wrote: ‘that a person has a legal obligation to do some-
thing does not mean the same as saying that he will be
punished if he does not perform that act’;34 or ‘the state-
ment that a rule is [legally] valid is an internal statement
recognising that the rule satisfies the test for identifying
what is to count as law […], and constitutes not a
prophecy of but a part of the reason for the decision’.35
These citations are only two excerpts from the long and
still strong methodological objection made by Hart
against different forms of legal pragmatism (realism)
generally.36 As B. Leiter recognises, Hart criticises legal
pragmatists by attaching to them a label of ‘conceptual
rule skepticism’, namely, an account according to which
‘it is impossible to articulate a simple idea that the law is
one thing, and a particular court’s decision another’.37
It seems that all we have here is the popular and contro-
versial theory of ‘a bad man’ here. But it would be a
mistake to equate this theory, actually a very parochial
(local) one, with the kind of overall philosophical view
about law that Holmes held. I think that we can distin-
guish at least two other, but somehow interconnected,
parochial theories in Holmes’s thinking and also one
more general conception under which, to some extent,
all the three parochial theories fall together. And that
general approach would have much to do with holistic
pragmatism; being the methodological stance, he
embraced to propose any, either local or more general,
claims about law (although Holmes himself did not use
the term ‘pragmatism’ to describe his own philosophy,
and, moreover, he was quite critical of pragmatic philos-
ophy in general, apart from some works of J. Dewey).38
Nowadays, it is quite clear that the ‘predictive theory’ is
not a descriptive theory of judicial behaviour, i.e. a nat-
uralistic theory of adjudication, just because it refers to
the reasons and facts upon which an operative lawyer
builds his prediction. The descriptive theory of adjudi-
cation rather should refer to the facts, rules, reasons,
34. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994), at 82.
35. Hart (1994), above n. 34, at 105.
36. As to the relations between legal pragmatism and legal realism, I think
that realism is an important but not the only possible upshot of pragma-
tism. In the case of Holmes’s ‘bad man’, we can speak interchangeably
about ‘realism’ and ‘pragmatism’, but there are also other less realistic
elements of Holmes’s pragmatic overview.
37. Leiter (2001), above n. 12, at 290.
38. I would not try to reconstruct legal pragmatism as a ‘comprehensive
theory of law’, as some theorists, like H. Dagan, do. Dagan argues for
the solid ‘realist conception of law’ (H. Dagan, The Realist Conception
of Law (2007)), and S. Perry shows a few general lines of argument in
Holmes’s view that are able to construe a ‘comprehensive theory’ simi-
lar, to some extent, to the simple theory of T. Hobbes (Perry, above n.
11, at 160). In each case, I perceive these reconstructions as interesting
and proposed in a much more charitable way than the one which I have
referred to as an uncharitable critique.
and motivations that an official actually has whilst com-
posing a decree, which are not necessarily exhaustive
and exactly the same elements that are taken into
account by the predicting lawyer. The lawyer and the
official have two different vantage points (the lawyer’s
point of view, who is trying to account for all factors rel-
evant to present a successful prediction, may not
account for all the factors that really determine judicial
reasoning but only for those that are directly affecting
the final opinion; on the other hand, a descriptive theory
of adjudication should account for all factors that really
influence judicial reasoning, even if they do not deter-
mine the final decree, and present the role they play, as
well as some explanation of their irrelevance/relevance
to the final decree). However, there is a strong incentive
to build a complex argument by referring to certain
interconnections between these two viewpoints (I sup-
pose that is actually what B. Leiter does39). M.G. White
notices that the crucial difference relates to the type of
theoretical statements (and their justifications) that are
produced by each parochial theory.40 A lawyer simply
defends his prediction by relying on descriptive prem-
ises, and thus the prediction is actually an empirical
statement (or a conjunction of empirical statements); on
the contrary, a judge defends his decree by assuming
some legal rules that are not, or at least not exhaustively,
empirical statements, and thus, his decree is not gener-
ally an empirical statement, but a normative decision,
having a ‘normative component’. Whether in the second
case judges use normative elements (norms, rules, etc.)
to create the decree, or only to justify it afterwards, it is
of a minor importance, since both mechanisms fall
under the overall description made by the empirical,
descriptive theory of adjudication. However, the impor-
tant general point is that none of those mentioned theo-
ries is conceptual and makes general claims about ‘what
is distinctive of any society’s legal norms’.41 They sim-
ply state what lawyers and judges do when they either
make predictions or decide cases; that is all.
Holmes’s pragmatic stance towards the second type of
theory can be seen clearly in his works. There are both
the descriptive and the normative elements (or both the
descriptive and the normative theories of adjudication).
On the purely descriptive level, such a theory simply
states that there are no essential elements that fall under
the description of how judges really think, and that is
why the only possible way is to – by the use of the more
modern language of Quine – analyse the actual causal-
nomological connections between underlying situation
types and actual judicial decisions (that is what B. Leiter
calls ‘naturalised jurisprudence’42). By being such a
descriptive theory of adjudication, it could probably be
classed as scientific and pragmatic but in a very banal
sense. Fortunately, Holmes’s theory of adjudication also
stays in close connection with his thoroughly pragmatic
39. Leiter (2001), above n. 12.
40. White (2002), above n. 15, at 144.
41. Leiter (2001), above n. 12, at 279.
42. Ibid.
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and anti-formalistic attitude towards judicial dissenting
opinions and the general role of the judge in the judicial
process (and this element contains both simple descrip-
tions of causal connections and much of the elements
characteristic of holistic pragmatism program). M.
Tushnet calls Holmes a ‘great dissenter’, meaning that
he was not only a great rhetorician but, more important-
ly, that he had dissented by having such a forward-look-
ing style that was vindicated by history. As A. Menden-
hall describes Holmes’s approach: ‘The language of
Holmes’s dissents were acrobatic. It acted and reacted
and called attention to itself. The more provocative and
aesthetic the language, the more likely it was for future
judges and commentators to return to the dissent to
reconsider Holmes’s argument – the more likely that
non-law might become law’.43
The aesthetics in judicial work, as was also clearly seen
by Holmes’s successor, B. Cardozo, is a great tool for
helping to influence reality in connection with what J.
Dewey once called ‘intelligence’.44 The main elements
of judicial tasks are thus twofold: to make an intelligent
study of law’s history that will illuminate the forces that
make the present law thus and so (historical element;
the reference to the cultural heritage) and of ‘the ends
which rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those
ends are desired, what is given up to gain them, and
whether those ends are worth the price’.45 Both these
aspects together lead to the typically liberal and pragma-
tist conclusion that a judge, whilst deciding the case,
should weigh ‘considerations of social advantage’ whilst
paying attention to statistics and economics in particular
circumstances, amongst other important social factors
(facts). The philosophical background of Holmes and
his pragmatist followers can be described as antidogmat-
ic, with an aversion to absolutes and foundationalism,
fascinated by contingency and process, putting great
focus on different perspectives (perspectivism) and the
necessity to relativise each phenomenon to the particu-
lar context of analysis and respecting the ‘ordinary’,
common-sensual ordering of things. As such, the local
considerations of Holmes, either made from the bad
man’s/good man’s perspective or the descriptive/nor-
mative analysis of the way judges think, fall under the
holistic program that aims to build an opinion by refer-
ence to a cultural/contextual heritage, contemporary
beliefs, and scientific and empirical evidence, with a for-
ward-looking perspective towards social change (the lat-
ter element is a kind of liberal-pragmatic ‘normative
punch’).
As L. Menand writes: ‘It was Holmes’s genius as a phi-
losopher to see that the law has no essential aspect’.46
The pragmatic character of all parochial theories that
43. Mendenhall, ‘Holmes’s Dissent’, 12 The Journal of Jurisprudence 697,
at 680-1 (2011).
44. Cf. J. Dewey, ‘Intelligence and Power’, The New Republic, 25th April
1934.
45. O.W. Holmes, Jr., ‘The Path of the Law’, 10 Harvard Law Review 457,
at 474 (1897); cf. Haack (2005), above n. 9, at 83.
46. L. Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America
(2001), at 339.
justify or explain particular decisions or dissents could
not then be reconciled into one general theory of law:
their locality grants Holmes’s theoretical ‘consistent
inconsistency’.47 However, in my opinion, by differenti-
ating certain types of Holmes’s theoretical efforts, by
setting certain relations between them, and by applying
the charity principle, as well as by allowing for some
amendments of his work, we can subscribe these efforts
under the more general view, namely, the ‘holistic prag-
matism’. I think this is what White suggests whilst he
recommends certain (and obvious) amendments of
Holmes’s pragmatism that ‘suffers from not being
explicitly holistic and from being insufficiently mindful
of questions surrounding the word “meaning”’.48 This
can be more clearly seen if we compare the role that
conceptual analysis plays in different types of theories,
in general theories, and in parochial theories of legal
pragmatists like Holmes or Cardozo.
4 What Does It Mean to
Explain a Concept (of Law)
in the Pragmatic Sense?
Sometimes the opposition between legal pragmatism
and other legal theories is built upon a reference to the
notion of the ‘nature’ or the ‘essence’ of law. ‘Whether
those who hold that statues, reports, and treatises them-
selves constitute the law have more than a trivial verbal
quarrel with Holmes is a nice question. It is customary
to construe the debate between legal realists and their
more traditional opponents as one between rival defini-
tions of “the same conce between competing attempts to
arrive at the “essence of law”’, but as White notices (and
I share that contention with him), ‘this is a doubtful
construal of the controversy’.49 On the other hand, it is
true that some of the legal pragmatists’ (realists’) work
was devoted to the attack on the ‘conceptualism’ of the
past, much of which was so aggressive that it degener-
ated into ‘childish nihilism’.50 But there are also modest
views that consciously refer to the conceptual heritage of
the past, views that allow for the coexistence of theories
from the ‘different conceptual levels’ – and these mod-
erate views can be connected, although probably to a
significant extent implicitly or tacitly, with holistic
pragmatism and conceptually reordered under its aegis.
At the beginning, it is important to note that to criticise
rationalism, as holistic pragmatism does, does not mean
47. Mendenhall (2011), above n. 43, at 683.
48. White (2002), above n. 15, at 152; cf. F. Kellogg, ‘Holistic Pragmatism
and Law: Morton White on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’, 40 Transac-
tions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 559, at 560 (2004). The necessity
of making additional differentiations and amendments to Holmes’s
theory is due to the fact that it lacks, as White and Kellogg notice, ‘phil-
osophical care’.
49. M.G. White, Social Thought in America. The Revolt against Formalism
(1976), at 62-3.
50. G. Gilmore, ‘Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure’, 40 The Yale Law Jour-
nal 1037, at 1038 (1961).
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to reject any concept analysis in its entirety. It can be
seen by referring to the most important pragmatic key-
stone: the Pragmatic Maxim. C. S. Peirce wrote:
It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third
grade of clearness of apprehension51 is as follows:
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our con-
ception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
is the whole of our conception of the object.52
There are several ways of interpreting this maxim (e.g.
as the method of clarifying meaning, as clarifying con-
ception, as the actual process of practical deliberation,
and so on). Here, I will limit myself to a few remarks. It
seems to be quite obvious that in practical deliberation,
we cannot generally avoid concept analysis, and this
maxim shows only which concepts (conceptions) are of
practical importance. From the vast set of concepts, we
can simply cut off ones that do not bear any practical,
observable effects. The maxim inevitably forces us to
use some kind of scientific test as a proper device to
evaluate our beliefs and in that way is connected with
‘fallibilism’. All speculative and metaphysical concep-
tions that cannot be tested scientifically (in the vast
meaning of the term ‘science’), having no practical bear-
ings, are not worth consideration. Maxim, being as gen-
eral as it is, is also a simple tool for comparing concepts:
two concepts that are supposed to be different, but have
the same practical bearings, are actually just the same
concept under two labels. The simple framework of the
maxim is backed up by the conviction that concepts are
labile and are subject to amendment or rejection. But
there is always a basic set (or ‘heritage’ according to
Quine and White) of concepts that serves as a starting
point for the mechanism of opinion settlement, general-
ly described by the Pragmatic Maxim. This maxim is a
‘method or approach to philosophical questions focused
on pragmatic consequences, not a body of philosophical
doctrine’.53 This general interpretation allows for both
the Peircian understanding of the ‘pragmatic’ following
Kantian ‘pragmatische’ (experimental) and the Jamesian
one that focuses on praxis (action as opposed to theory).54
I think it is now easy to see the parallel between
Holmes’s presentation of the ‘prediction theory’ and
51. Peirce’s distinction between the three grades of clarity of concepts (the
first grade, an unreflective grasp of the concept in everyday experience;
the second grade, a definition of the concept; the third grade, the Prag-
matic Maxim) reveals the difference between ‘having a merely verbal
understanding of a scientific concept and having a seriously knowledge-
able grasp of what it involves’ (S. Haack, ‘The Growth of Meaning and
the Limits of Formalism: in Science and Law’, 29(1) Analisis Filosofico
5, at 11 (2009)). This method of concept clarification is especially useful
in legal science, where the growth of meaning can advance rapidly in a
short period of time.
52. Peirce (1878), above n. 2.
53. Haack (2005), above n. 9, at 76.
54. On different meaning of ‘pragmatic’ in pragmatists’ works, see, for
example, Haack (2005), above n. 9.
Peirce’s general statement of the Maxim55: the suffering,
the potential harm, or gain caused by the judicial deci-
sion, predicted by a lawyer, is all we can measure empir-
ically. However, the simple prediction theory has never
been claimed to be an exhaustive, general theory of law,
and as I showed above, it is not the only theory that
Holmes himself explicitly developed. On the contrary,
Holmes stressed that his theory was local (or ‘parochial’
according to White); it focused on one, particular, legal
system and did it from a very specified perspective –
that of an operative lawyer. However, S. Haack persua-
sively suggests that Holmes’s philosophy is much more
sophisticated than the label ‘prediction theory’ implies,
and she shows how The Path of the Law leads from a
couple of cynical statements about the concept of legal
obligation that actually are ‘the mundane specificities of
the working attorney’ at the beginning of the lecture, to
the end, where we can see the great ‘intellectual aspira-
tions of the legal theorist’.56 To a large extent she is
right, but she builds that argument extensively by show-
ing some general strands in Holmes’s thinking and cites
many of his other works, decisions, and dissents as evi-
dence. I think the way in which such a conclusion can be
reached is much easier, as far as we focus on the mean-
ing of conceptual analysis that was conducted by
Holmes himself in connection with many, maybe not
perfectly clearly distinguished but nevertheless present,
theoretical points of view of law that he, at least implic-
itly, proposed. And in all these mini-theoretical cases,
the pragmatic maxim can be in use.
Although Holmes refused to use the label ‘pragmatism’,
he may well be called a pragmatist, simply because ‘he
treats rules and standards as necessarily communal and
objective, and because he describes the legislative func-
tion performed by the community in determining and
applying law. These notions are fundamentally Peir-
cian’.57 And this is characteristic not only of The Path of
the Law but also of other major works, including The
Common Law which ‘felt the necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of pub-
lic policy, avowed or unconscious’ to be the communal,
objective standards by which every law is determined,
staying in contrast to private and subjective (Holmes
called it ‘moral’) standards.58 The distinction, developed
in that publication, between external (objective, com-
munal) and internal (subjective, moral) standards can be
easily seen in The Path of the Law, where Holmes pres-
ents a strong claim concerning the separation of law and
morals. It is, however, crucial not to confuse this claim
with the positivist separation thesis. As Kellogg notices:
‘What Holmes meant in eschewing moral language was
not an ontic separation but a fallibilist insight, in effect
competing principles can generally be found on both
55. And I leave open the historical controversy over whether it was Peirce
who inspired Holmes or the reverse (during their activity in the Meta-
physical Club the end of the 1860s and the beginning of the 1870s).
56. Haack (2005), above n. 9, at 82.
57. Note: ‘Holmes, Peirce and Legal Pragmatism’, 84 (5) The Yale Law
Journal 1123, at 1125 (1975).
58. Note (1975), above n. 57, at 1127.
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sides of controversial case, and moral argument from
them amounts to “hollow deduction from empty general
propositions”’.59 According to the Pragmatic Maxim, in
order to be meaningful, a concept must have practical
consequences that are both public and communal (due
to Peirce’s critique of introspection that stays in connec-
tion with his anti-Cartesianism), and Holmes’s basic
distinction between internal and external standards
‘responds to the same philosophical impulse that led
Peirce to say that all knowledge of our psychological
states is derived from observation of public facts’.60
What is more, in addition to this parallel between the
pragmatic methods of Peirce’s and Holmes’s views of
law, there are deeply holistic roots to Holmes’s thinking
that can be found in the philosophy of C. Wright who
taught him, according to Holmes’s own words, that he
‘must not say necessary about the universe, that we don’t
know whether anything is necessary or not’,61 and we
can only bet on the behaviour of the universe (Holmes
discussed the notion of bet ability being a form of pre-
dictability). Wright argues for the holistic account of a
socially rooted development of perception, cognition,
and language, being anti-Cartesian and pro-Darwin all
at the same time. This may stand as a real historical
background of Holmes’s holistic thinking.62
The problem that triggered so much of the unfriendly
critique against the ‘predictive theory of law’ was that
Holmes speaks very loosely of meaning. In The Path of
the Law, he concentrates on the perspective of a ‘bill-
paying client’, who ‘does not pay a lawyer to make dis-
putable philosophical claims about general legal con-
cepts’.63 However, unfortunately, Holmes seems to treat
‘the prediction (prophecy)’ and ‘the law’ as synonyms.
That causes a lot of confusion if one does not recognise
the two features characterising Holmes’s writings. First,
Holmes explicitly stated his own view about ‘meaning’,
whilst he said that the word ‘law’, as many other words,
may be properly used in many different ways. ‘[A] word
is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and time in
which it is used’.64 Second, as we can see, Holmes used
a very artistic language, full of cynical, sharp metaphors
and epigrams (and that style remained characteristic of
further pragmatists’ legal writings). As I indicated earli-
er, the ‘bad man’s point of view’ is only a heuristic
device of an operative lawyer who does not assume any
strict connection between law and morality. This is,
however, only one of many ways in which one can
describe law or theorise about law. Besides the bad
man’s point of view, we can distinguish also (1) the
‘good man’s point of view’, from which all the possible
positive effects of the decision other than fear and harm
are evaluated (that perspective, however, could be inclu-
59. Kellogg (2004), above n. 48, at 565.
60. Note (1975), above n. 57, at 1132.
61. Kellog (2004), above n. 48, at 562.
62. Kellog (2004), above n. 48, at 563.
63. White (2002), above n. 15, at 137.
64. O.W. Holmes, Jr., U.S.S.C., Towne v. Eisner 245 (1918) 418, at 425.
ded under the aegis of the ‘predictive theory’ by a sim-
ple but ‘charitable’ amendment of what Holmes origi-
nally wrote); (2) the reconstructed officials’ point of
view,65 which amounts apparently to a descriptive theo-
ry of adjudication sensu largo,66 i.e. ‘a theory about what
it is that judges really do when they decide cases’ (this
point of view is characteristic of efforts made by legal
realists; it is different from the bad man’s and the good
man’s points of view, because it does not fall under the
aegis of the ‘predictive theory’, as far as no judge would
predict his own decision – he would rather refer tacitly
or explicitly to some legal theory to construe it67); and
(3) the general jurisprudential point of view that aims at
analysing important legal concepts; it divides into at
least two types of the theory: one that allows for either a
methodologically external or detached point of view
(e.g. legal positivism) and the other ones that claim that
it is impossible to separate moral valuations from con-
ceptual analysis and social-phenomena description (‘law
as integrity’, ius-naturalism).
There are two important things I want to stress in the
context of this differentiation: ‘conceptual gradualism’
and the ‘parochial-general discrimination’. First, the
requirements of scientific precision rise gradually as we
move from the theory of the first type (both good man’s
and bad man’s theories, where the pragmatist razor cuts
off all concepts that have no experimental bearings but,
on the other hand, allows for a very labile use of certain
concepts) towards the theory of the third type that focu-
ses on deeper analysis of the concepts that are supposed
to be at least temporarily settled (rigid concepts are
much easier to analyse, either by logical or non-logical
methods). Second, there is a substantial difference
between theories that are fully fledged pragmatic enter-
prises such as the predictive theory (that are parochial,
relativised to space and time) and more general theories
that focus on the way in which a legal official performs
so-called reasoning according to law or even the most
general theories that fall under the aegis of ‘general
jurisprudence’ that aim to give detailed analysis of the
most general, universal legal concepts (‘reasoning about
law’). The most important feature of that differentiation
is that the former theories must always presuppose, at
least tacitly, some of the important assumptions of the
latter that are both more general and usually more
detailed (at this general level).
65. The relation between the reconstructed officials’ point of view and the
apparent, institutional officials’ point of view is such that the former
includes the latter (but not vice versa). The latter involves primarily gen-
eral, mutual officials’ beliefs about the way they perceive their own
institutional enterprise. In other words, the latter point of view compri-
ses of how officials think about what they do (like construing a ‘norma-
tive decision’ and how they can justify it), but do not necessarily involve
the description of what they actually do (which the former view
includes).
66. In contrast, the apparent, institutional officials’ point of view mentioned
in the footnote above, being in fact a description of the shared theory
of how should judge justify her decision as ‘normative’ or ‘binding’ in
context of existing legal institutions, can be dubbed a ‘theory of adjudi-
cation sensu stricto’.
67. Leiter (2001), above n. 12, at 279.
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The conceptual analysis is characteristic of the broadest
theories of the latter type. These theories are general,
and their main task is, as in case of legal positivism, to
explain the main concepts that reflect the fundamental
features of societies. J. Raz once stated that ‘We do not
want to be slaves of words. Our aim is to understand
society and its institutions’,68 and the proper tool to do
that, to reveal the most important and universal features
of law, is conceptual analysis. B. Leiter notices that this
kind of analysis has two important features.69 First, the
analysis aims at describing law and its institutions as
conceptually different from other types of social/cultur-
al institutions. Such an idea stays in close relation to so-
called Autonomy Thesis (a conceptual thesis developed
in part by G. Postema70) and has its empirical counter-
part in the Limited Domain Thesis.71 Both those theses
describe (or refer to) the criteria of legality, but the first
does it on the highest, most conceptual level; the second
thesis is merely an observational, factual statement. The
second is the role, presumably distinctive, that law plays
in practical reasoning of officials and citizens. This the-
sis is supposed to explain the normative, reason-giving
character of law, namely, how law purports to guide
anyone’s conduct. Those two points, however different,
are usually combined on the grounds of conceptual,
general jurisprudence. Positivists think that the reason
givingness of law is strictly connected with the idea that
legal reasons are autonomous reasons, and non-positi-
vists, like Dworkin, argue that the normative character
of law is strictly connected with law being morally valid
and thus nonautonomous. However, I am not going to
describe this discussion in detail here.
Instead, I would like simply to state that in the case of
legal pragmatism, neither of these two points is at stake.
Legal pragmatists, with the prime example of Holmes,
just do not care (in the sense: they do not primarily care)
about concepts that are discussed by academics. They
do not care how it happens – although they may consid-
er such theorising as a great intellectual play – that peo-
ple’s behaviour is governed by reasons delivered by the
law nor why and in what circumstances law has authori-
ty and whether it is autonomous or not. On the contra-
ry, the conceptual scaffolding of legal pragmatists is a
very simple one and can be reduced to the use of scien-
tific methods, as simple as possible, to build an opinion
(a holistic conjunction of beliefs) that would either help
to predict a decree for a paying client or to justify a
decree in certain a political and cultural context. Such
efforts, however, do not supplant the need of using
more general, conceptual schemes that would account
for a ‘comprehensive theory of law’.
68. J. Raz ‘Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law’, in J. Raz (ed.), The
Authority of Law (1979) 37, at 41.
69. Leiter (2001), above n. 12.
70. G. Postema ‘Law’s Autonomy and Public Practical Reason’, in R.P.
George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (1996)
79.
71. F. Schauer, ‘The Limited Domain of Law’, 90 (7) Virginia Law Review
1909 (2004).
Nevertheless, the relation between the most parochial
predictive theory, the empirical theory of adjudication,
and a general theory of law is as follows. The predictive
theory must assume at least some kind of an empirical
theory of adjudication, because an operative lawyer
must know what rules, facts, reasons, and motivations
could be applied or referred to by a judge who is com-
posing a decree. A lawyer’s concern is about ‘predictions
of the incidence of the public force through the instru-
mentality of the courts’,72 which are what a bad man
pays a lawyer to make. To make such predictions, a law-
yer must know much more than only the set of legal
rules that the judge is likely to apply, but amongst these
are quite simple concepts like the concept of the author-
itative judge. As White argues, the lawyer and his client
are not interested in ‘useless quintessence of all legal
systems’, and Holmes and other legal pragmatists do not
define the words ‘judge’, ‘authority’, or ‘the law’; they
simply ‘know the judge [and respect “authority” or “the
law/statute”] when they see one’. So, on this level, ‘the
judge’ can be defined ostensively, but this also demands
some deeper presupposition of the ‘authority’ that
grants the judge the power to resolve cases.73 Further-
more, any kind of a theory of adjudication must presup-
pose – and this is quite suggestively elaborated on by
Leiter – ‘a non-skeptical account of legality’74 and must,
to some extent, rest on some conception of a legitimate
legal authority. Only in these circumstances could the
court decision be ‘justified’, or even ‘understood’, as a
decision of a court. It is so because no one is obligated to
act with simple lawyers’ prophecies or even empirical
statements about the way in which judges are reasoning.
All parochial theories need some more general view as
their background assumptions.
What is interesting is that Holmes himself seems to
agree with this notion when he claims that we still ‘have
too little theory than too much’,75 although he does not
appear to be developing, in The Path of the Law, a theo-
ry of a comprehensive type. Nevertheless, it seems to be
obvious that Holmes, both in this lecture and in other
writings and rulings, usually introduced more general,
typically pragmatist, methodological precepts of empiri-
cal sciences. The arguments presented by White, and
comments given, for instance, by F. Kellogg, suggest
that he would probably enthusiastically meet the
amendments and clarifications made from the perspec-
tive of a unifying but interdisciplinary holistic pragma-
tism.76
White notices that Holmes fails to discuss the concept of
law or the concept of legal authority at a greater length,
and he thinks, like Leiter, that there must have been
72. Holmes (1897), above n. 45, at 457.
73. White (2002), above n. 15, at 131.
74. Leiter (2001), above n. 12.
75. Holmes (1897), above n. 45, at 476.
76. Kellogg writes: ‘[I]f Holmes had lived just 25 years longer to read
White’s Toward Reunion in Philosophy (1956), especially the passage
on pp. 161-2 in which White compares philosophical definition with the
process of legal adjudication, he would have uttered the famous ‘Good
for you!’ with which he welcomed an excellent argument in the
Supreme Court’ (Kellogg (2004), above n. 48, at 565).
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some deeper positivistic assumption about the nature of
law (some kind of a Social Fact Thesis) that would ena-
ble parochial theories to work. However, S. Haack
writes: ‘Holmesian argument seems, as it stands, covert-
ly to presuppose the kind of purely abstract and essenti-
alist philosophy of law that he officially, and in my opin-
ion – rightly – eschews’.77 The question now is whether
every general, jurisprudential theory of law must be
‘essentialist’ in the sense that it would reveal ‘the very
nature of law’? I think that we can answer this question
in two different ways, but having the same effect. Firstly
and more commonly, there appears a discrimination
between two types of a general, conceptual analysis:
ambitious and non-ambitious conceptual analysis (in
different terminology: immodest and modest conceptual
analysis78). The point is that the non-ambitious (mod-
est) conceptual analysis strives at the most accurate
translation (‘paraphrasing’, in Quine’s words) and
rational change (in light of particular, empirical evi-
dence) of the ‘folk theory’ of certain things, whilst the
ambitious (immodest) analysis strives to determine the
way things really are. For example, Hart’s conceptual
analysis, being an enterprise in ‘descriptive sociology’, is
probably best understood as a non-ambitious (modest)
analysis, because it tries simply to present the way in
which some constellation of basic legal concepts (it is a
kind of legal-theoretical vocabulary that covers both
actual and possible cases of concept application) is made
true by another, more basic vocabulary, rooted in the
folk theory of law. So, in its modest type, the conceptual
analysis role is that, by Jackson’s own words, ‘of
addressing the question of what to say about matters
described in one set of terms given a story about matters
described in another set of terms. Conceptual analysis is
not being given a central role in determining the funda-
mental nature of our world; it is, rather, being given a
central role in determining what to say in less funda-
mental terms given an account of the world stated in
more fundamental terms’.79 Modest analysis serves to
‘elucidate concepts by determining how subjects classify
possibilities, and [Jackson] emphasises that conceptual
analysis is an hypothetical-deductive exercise’.80 If that
type of analysis, characteristic of the mainstream activity
of analytical jurisprudence, means actually ‘seeking the
hypothesis that makes best sense of a person’s responses
to possible cases, taking into account all the evidence’,81
that seems at least compatible with pragmatic fallibilism
and holism more generally. And, of course, in this case,
searching for a conceptual ‘quintessence of law’ does not
necessarily mean searching for a ‘nature of law’ in any of
77. Haack (2005), above n. 9, at 88.
78. F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998); for the legal context see
V. Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘A Defence of Hart’s Semantics as Non Ambitious
Conceptual Analysis’, 9 Legal Theory 99 (2003).
79. Jackson (1998), above n. 78, at 44.
80. Rodriguez-Blanco (2003), above n. 78, at 104.
81. Jackson (1998), above n. 78, at 36; cf. Rodriguez-Blanco(2003), above
n. 78, at 105.
essentialist meanings of that term.82 So, this general
stance can be reconciled with harsh pragmatists’ nega-
tive response to any ‘essentialist’ (and in this ambitious
sense ‘conceptual’) theory of law. Had Holmes lived
long enough he could be really interested in such a non-
ambitious reading of Hart’s theory. Nonetheless, he
would probably be very disappointed by its further
essentialist developments, to which Hart himself con-
tributed, for example, by making reference to ‘descrip-
tive sociology’ and suggesting that law is exclusively and
essentially determined by special, foundational social
facts.83 Embracing a modest analytic apparatus allows to
read Hart in a non-essentialist mode, however, at the
expense of loosing some features of the broadly ‘Har-
tian’ theory that has been extensively discussed through
the years.
Secondly, it seems to be quite certain from the whole of
White’s enterprise in the philosophy of culture that
when he criticises Holmes for being ‘too parochial’ and
says that his theory must presuppose the more general
theory of legal authority (like the Hartian one), he does
not think of such a theory as foundationalist or essential-
ist. He is a holistic pragmatist, so far! White reads Hart
modestly, in the way described above. That would mean
that the holistic pragmatism could be perceived as a
background for a general theory of law, as well as for
many parochial theories that tacitly presuppose that one.
It would be very interesting to discuss how both general
and parochial theories of law apply the holistic pragma-
tist’s machinery and what the limits are of such an
application.
5 Epilogue: Legal Pragmatism
as an ‘Independent Theory
of Law’?
When discussing O. W. Holmes’s answer to the ques-
tion What constitutes the law?, M. G. White underlines
the simple fact that Holmes’s inquiry did not focus on
developing the concept of law. White argues: ‘Holmes
said little in The Path of the Law about the notion of
legal authority, perhaps because he was interested not in
what he called a “useless quintessence of all legal sys-
tems” but in “an accurate anatomy of one”’.84 Such
ambition (or lack of ambition) is characteristic of many
pragmatic enterprises in the legal field. However, many
legal philosophers who aim at revealing the very ‘nature
of law’ (or ‘the concept of law’ as H. L. A. Hart did) try
to interpret Holmes and other pragmatists as offering a
82. Actually, there is a very simple way to show that the question from The
Path of the Law, namely, the question What constitutes the law? is not
a general jurisprudential question. The ‘the’ prefix suggests the local
character of it. On the contrary, Hart and Dworkin ask What is law?
and the lack of ‘the’ prefix suggests the most possible general sense of
their inquiry.
83. That puts the whole Hartian discourse on the ‘metaphysical track’.
84. White (2002), above n. 15, at 130.
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competitive view to their own. As I have (at least parti-
ally) tried to demonstrate, this is wrong and oversimpli-
fies the problem. Holmes, and other legal pragmatists,
could have held many parochial accounts of local legal
concepts at the same time, being ‘consistently inconsis-
tent’. On the other hand, we can differentiate between
very parochial, modestly parochial, and general theories
of law. Parochial theories must be partially presupposed
by some concepts of a more general provenience and
thus be at least partially independent85 from the general
ones. The independence in the above-mentioned sense
is not full; thus, probably it would be more proper to
speak of each and every legal pragmatist effort as an
‘underdetermined theory of law’. I would not use the
word ‘parochial’ nor the word ‘local’ to describe the
legal pragmatists’ approach generally, but I think that
particular divagations could be treated as tiny, ‘paro-
chial’ theories built from a local perspective, but by the
use of the same ‘holistic machinery’ (that grants their
general consistency). Moreover, I think that there could
be many more local perspectives than the ones legal
pragmatists have yet presented. What is important is
that they all tend to fall under more general methodolo-
gy, namely, holistic pragmatism, and hence they can
coexist conceptually with some other, more general, the-
ories that also accept, or at least do not deny, that meta-
philosophical position.
If one does not read the aims of the theoretical back-
ground accurately, she/he may use the methodological
objection I introduced in the beginning incorrectly and
in consequence, think that the ‘premises of the theory
are shaky’ and thus its ‘promises – overstated’.86 We can
see that there need not be any conflict between concep-
tual analysis of a moderate (non-ambitious) type and
legal pragmatist efforts. Moreover, it seems to be quite
promising to use the scaffolding of holistic pragmatism
to both evaluate existing general legal theories and to
explore a general theory of law that would be quite con-
sistent and pre-suppositional for all parochial theories of
law, the ones in which legal pragmatists are most inter-
ested. After all, M. White’s holistic pragmatism is prob-
ably the best of all efforts to unify pragmatic philoso-
phy.87 It fits the metaphor of G. Papini who once com-
pared pragmatism to a hotel where all the guests pass
through the same corridor, but each works alone in his
85. The independency claim I am making here is a claim about the relation
between theories that fall under different degrees of generality. It is not
the claim about the rigid independency, or even autonomy, of different
(at face value) cultural domains (science, law, art, ethics), because
according to the metaphilosphical position of holistic pragmatism, they
simply could not be separated. Parochial theories are not themselves
instances (tokens) of these more general theories. Rather, as I tried to
show, parochial theories in fact work in virtue of some background the-
ories (e.g. general theory of ‘authority’). The holistic framework is the
most general on the scale.
86. Gilmore (1961), above n. 50, at 1037.
87. Kellogg (2004), above n. 48; Pihlström (2011), above n. 15.
own room88 and as such, stands as a prime candidate for
the resolution of apparent confusions about legal philos-
ophy as well.
88. ‘As the young Italian pragmatist [Giovanni] Papini has well said, [prag-
matism] lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel. Innu-
merable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an
atheistic volume; in the next, someone on his knees praying for faith
and strength; in a third a chemist investigating a body’s properties. In a
fourth a system of idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated; in a fifth
the impossibility of metaphysic is being shown. But they all own the
corridor, and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of
getting into or out of their respective rooms’ (James, above n. 3, at 32;
cf. S. Haack, ‘The Pluralistic Universe of Law: Towards a Neo-Classical
Legal Pragmatism’, 21(4) Ratio Juris 453, at 454 (2008)).
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